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Hore, Peter, ed. The Genesis of Naval Thinking since the End of the Cold War. Maritime Strategic Studies
Institute Paper 2, March 1999. 109pp.
Over the past decade, the U.S. Navy has
undergone a profound shift in its strategy
and thinking. This collection of thought-
ful essays written by senior Royal Navy
officers between 1992 and 1998 makes it
clear that soul-searching by naval think-
ers has not been confined to the United
States. Eric Grove’s foreword, tracing the
evolution of British naval thought over
this period, and Captain Edwin Atkinson’s
essay, “The Influence of Sea Power upon
Peace,” demonstrate how closely the
thinking, assessments, and recommenda-
tions being made in the United Kingdom
paralleled those made in the U.S. Navy’s
“. . . From the Sea” process. It is certainly
an interesting commentary on the eternal
verities of naval thinking that what Grove
calls an “intellectual revolution” occurred
without any formal exchange between
these two very different groups, each of
which was engaged in an “in house” effort.
The real value of these essays, however,
lies not in the history of post–Cold War
naval thought but in what they say about
a continuing revolution in naval thinking
on both sides of the Atlantic—especially
the efforts to stretch declining force levels
to deal with extended commitments. A
particularly salient essay in this regard is
Vice Admiral Alan West’s “1919–1991:
The Need for a United Kingdom Grand
Strategy.” West’s forthright analysis of
Britain’s failed attempt to adapt to a new
strategic environment after World War I
points to the lack of a coherent national
“grand” strategy, to destructive
interservice rivalries, and to military
planning driven by costs alone. The lack
of a grand strategy in particular left Brit-
ain unable to make any meaningful
trade-off between the limited means ac-
corded the military in the interwar years
and the far-reaching commitments that
British forces were directed to meet.
Compounding the problem was the pol-
icy makers’ assumption that Britain “will
not be engaged in any great war during
the next ten years,” a fiscally convenient
dictum that persisted well into the 1930s
despite evidence to the contrary and that
ultimately left Britain unprepared for
war. All of this should have a familiar
ring to today’s readers. Indeed, it is the
currency of these problems that gives this
essay its greatest impact.
Of equal, if different, significance is a se-
ries of essays by Brigadier Robert Fry,
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Vice Admiral J. J. Blackham, and Admiral
Sir Peter Abbott, written between 1995
and 1998. These provide perceptive Brit-
ish insights on the changing maritime
dimension of our post–Cold War world
and the increased roles for maneuvers
and forward presence in shaping a new
strategic environment. These are exactly
the kinds of issues with which the U.S.
armed forces are now struggling.
The essays’ chief drawbacks are their
brevity and what they do not say. The in-
sights presented are clearly worthwhile
and for that very reason deserve expan-
sion. For example, what were the work-
ing-level debates that undergirded the
flag officers’ presentations? The fact that
the essays cover the seven-year period up
to only three years ago would indicate
that the issues raised with regard to the
changing role of naval forces in the new
century are still as far from being fully re-
solved in the Royal Navy as they are in
the U.S. naval service. This suggests room
for both an equivalent American publica-
tion and another Maritime Strategic
Studies Institute paper, as both navies
continue the process of rethinking naval
power that collectively began in 1991.
EDWARD A. SMITH, JR.
Captain, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
Washington Studies and Analysis
The Boeing Company
Arlington, Virginia
Berkowitz, Bruce D., and Allan E. Goodman. Best
Truth: Intelligence in the Information Age. New
Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 2000. 203pp. $22.50
The U.S. intelligence community, as it
currently exists, is fundamentally flawed
and must be remade. With this opening
premise, Bruce Berkowitz, a senior con-
sultant at RAND Corporation, and Allan
Goodman, former dean of the
Georgetown University School of Foreign
Service, present their blue-
print for the future of Ameri-
can intelligence.
According to the authors, a
trio of factors threatens to
leave the intelligence commu-
nity ineffective and irrelevant.
First, it is no revelation that
the end of the Cold War has
left the intelligence commu-
nity without a single clear threat as a fo-
cus for its analytic efforts. The past
emphasis on the Soviet Union offered in-
telligence analysts historical continuity.
Change tended to be evolutionary; for
example, one generation of Soviet sub-
marines offered insights into the next.
Today, however, nations and nonstate
actors have unprecedented access to
technology and information and with it a
new capability to organize and operate
rapidly across borders. These develop-
ments create the prospect of an “instan-
taneous threat” against the United States
from entirely unexpected sources.
Second, if Carl von Clausewitz was cor-
rect in defining intelligence as “every sort
of information about the enemy and his
country,” fundamental changes in infor-
mation management must create funda-
mental changes in intelligence. Berkowitz
and Goodman observe that the intelli-
gence community was created on an
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A book reviewer occupies a position of special re-
sponsibility and trust. He is to summarize, set in
context, describe strengths, and point out weak-
nesses. As a surrogate for us all, he assumes a
heavy obligation which it is his duty to discharge
with reason and consistency.
ADMIRAL H. G. RICKOVER
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